PNT-resilience framework cross-walk
Aligned to, not rated or approved. This maps Kshana's simulated capabilities to the
published PNT-resilience (PNT: positioning, navigation and timing) frameworks. It is a simulation-derived self-assessment
aligned to the DHS/CISA (DHS: Department of Homeland Security; CISA: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) Resilient PNT Conformance Framework (RPCF) v2.0, the
RethinkPNT/Firesmith Resist-Detect-Respond-Recover (RDRR) model, and Yang
Yuanxi's resilient-PNT criteria. It is not a rating, an approval, an accreditation, or a
compliance statement, and it carries no endorsement from DHS, IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), or any
authority. Every row is labelled with its honest verification status
(VALIDATED against an external oracle, or MODELLED from first principles with
tests); the resilience-scoring layer itself is MODELLED. Two of its kernels carry
their own VALIDATED rows in the verification matrix, the inverse-Simpson diversity
kernel (resilience::diversity) and the rank-order statistics kernel
(resilience::stats); that validates the arithmetic, not the scores built on it.
The scoring engine (src/resilience/) consumes these capabilities and emits
per-dimension sub-scores, never a single phantom number. See
src/verification.rs for the machine-checked status invariants.
DHS RPCF v2.0: what the framework defines, and Kshana's own sub-score categories#
The published framework (Resilient PNT Conformance Framework, Version 2.0, 26 April 2022, DHS Science and Technology Directorate with CISA) defines three core functions (section 5.2: Prevent, Respond, Recover), resilience levels 0 to 4 (section 5.3) and eight numbered minimum requirements spread over Levels 1 to 4 (section 5.3, restated in 5.5), plus an evaluation approach (section 8). It does not define a list of seven technique categories. An earlier version of this page, and the resilience module comments, described seven "RPCF technique categories"; the words Obfuscate and Diversify do not appear in v2.0. The text of that document was re-read on 2026-10-09 and no such list was found.
The seven sub-score names the scoring engine emits (Obfuscate, Limit, Verify, Isolate, Diversify, Mitigate, Recover; "OLVIDMR" is our mnemonic) are therefore Kshana's own scoring categories, kept for output stability. They are not DHS terms and the rows below do not say DHS requires them. Where a category lines up with a framework requirement the last column says so; where it does not, it says "none".
| Kshana sub-score category | Kshana capability used as the driver | Module | Status | Nearest RPCF v2.0 reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Obfuscate | Declared technique × source quality (no direct behavioural driver) | resilience::score |
MODELLED | none (a prevention technique; section 5.2, Prevent) |
| Limit | Declared technique × source quality | resilience::score |
MODELLED | none (a prevention technique; section 5.2, Prevent) |
| Verify | Impairment-detector AUC (area under the curve) under the scenario (spoof/jam/meacon monitors) | impairment_eval, resilience::score |
MODELLED | Level 2 requirement 4; Level 3 requirement 7 |
| Isolate | Declared technique × source quality | resilience::score |
MODELLED | Level 3 requirement 6 |
| Diversify | Independent-group count → inverse-Simpson effective diversity | resilience::diversity |
MODELLED | Level 4 requirement 8; section 5.5 (common mode) |
| Mitigate | Availability under denial | fom, resilience::score |
MODELLED | section 5.2, Respond |
| Recover | Holdover coast × bounded-degradation gate | fom, holdover, resilience::timeline |
MODELLED | Level 2 requirement 5; section 5.2, Recover |
The per-requirement mapping to the real framework, with what Kshana outputs support evidence for and what is left over, is in compliance/dhs-rpcf.md.
RethinkPNT / Firesmith RDRR functions#
| Function | Driver | Module | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resist | Mean of Obfuscate/Limit/Isolate/Diversify sub-scores | resilience::score |
MODELLED |
| Detect | Verify sub-score (detector AUC) | resilience::score |
MODELLED |
| Respond | Mitigate sub-score (availability) | resilience::score |
MODELLED |
| Recover | Holdover × bounded gate; resilience-timeline key performance indicators (KPIs: detect/react/recover/loss) | resilience::timeline |
MODELLED |
Yang Yuanxi criteria (the subset the timing/detection figures of merit speak to)#
| Criterion | Driver | Module | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Availability | Availability under denial | resilience::score |
MODELLED |
| Reliability | Filter integrity fraction | fom, resilience::score |
MODELLED |
| Continuity | Holdover × bounded gate | resilience::timeline |
MODELLED |
| Accuracy | Timing/quality proxy — position-domain accuracy is not part of the score. fom::positioning_performance turns a supplied position covariance and HPL (horizontal protection level) into CEP/SEP/2DRMS (circular error probable, spherical error probable, twice the distance root mean square), but no scenario feeds it into the resilience score |
resilience::score |
MODELLED (timing-domain only) |
What this cross-walk does not claim#
- No conferred RPCF Level. The assigned Level is a tentative, simulation-derived reading with an explicit bounded-degradation gate, not a conferred maturity.
- No position-domain accuracy in the score. The resilience sub-scores are built from
timing-domain and detection metrics. The engine does compute positions elsewhere (the
pvt,gnss-insandleo-pvtkinds) and protection levels (theintegritykind), but the scoring layer does not consume them. - No field validation. The reference panel and threat ensemble are synthetic,
parameter-grounded reductions (
resilience::panel), stated as a first-class limitation.
The companion study (resilience::study) exists precisely to show that collapsing
these dimensions into one composite score or one Level produces a rating whose
architecture ranking is unstable under defensible weighting and threat choices —
so this cross-walk is a measurement layer to be read per-dimension, not a single
grade to rate a product against.
Resilience and vertical scenarios that exercise these layers#
The bundled scenarios below run the threat and recovery machinery the cross-walk rows point at. Each is a real run of the named kind; every one is MODELLED (no field data).
Scenario (scenarios/) |
Kind | What it shows |
|---|---|---|
conflict-resilience.toml |
conflict-resilience |
Layered PNT under a shared jamming/spoofing threat: a seeded Monte Carlo of layer denial, inverse-variance fusion of the survivors, the single-layer vs layered total-loss ratio, and how correlated denial collapses that ratio. Its Monte-Carlo-to-closed-form and fusion identities are checked by in-crate tests; the kind has no verification-matrix row, so it is graded MODELLED here. |
leo-resilience-gnss-jammed-leo-carries.toml |
campaign |
GNSS (global navigation satellite system) jammed, a low Earth orbit (LEO) PNT layer carries the user, integrity kept (three phases on one timeline). |
leo-resilience-multiband-diversity.toml, leo-resilience-spoof-monitors.toml |
campaign |
One jammer against a four-band receiver; which spoofing monitor sees which spoofer. |
leo-resilience-js-margin.toml |
spectrum |
The jammer-to-signal (J/S) margin from received power. |
leo-resilience-spoof-doppler.toml |
leo-pass |
Spoofing detection by Doppler and pass-geometry consistency. |
leo-vertical-5g-network-timing.toml, leo-vertical-critical-infrastructure-timing.toml |
campaign |
Base-station and critical-infrastructure timing in holdover, with LEO time. |
leo-vertical-autonomous-vehicle.toml, leo-vertical-rail-maritime.toml, leo-vertical-polar-arctic.toml, leo-vertical-asset-tracking-iot.toml |
campaign |
Road, rail, maritime, polar and Internet of Things (IoT) users with a LEO layer. |
automotive-urban-canyon.toml, small-uas-jammed-nav.toml |
gnss-ins |
GNSS/INS (inertial navigation system) dead reckoning through an urban canyon and through jamming on a small uncrewed aircraft. |
maritime-port-approach-coast.toml, rail-tunnel-coast.toml |
ins-trn-coast |
How long an INS keeps a ship or a train inside its limit with GNSS denied. |
maritime-strait-jamming.toml, maritime-spoof-position-push.toml |
jamming, spoof-detect |
A maritime jammer; detecting a spoofer that drags a ship's reported position. |