Integrity and interferenceEdit on GitHubSource: docs/RESILIENCE-CROSSWALK.md

PNT-resilience framework cross-walk

Aligned to, not rated or approved. This maps Kshana's simulated capabilities to the published PNT-resilience (PNT: positioning, navigation and timing) frameworks. It is a simulation-derived self-assessment aligned to the DHS/CISA (DHS: Department of Homeland Security; CISA: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) Resilient PNT Conformance Framework (RPCF) v2.0, the RethinkPNT/Firesmith Resist-Detect-Respond-Recover (RDRR) model, and Yang Yuanxi's resilient-PNT criteria. It is not a rating, an approval, an accreditation, or a compliance statement, and it carries no endorsement from DHS, IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), or any authority. Every row is labelled with its honest verification status (VALIDATED against an external oracle, or MODELLED from first principles with tests); the resilience-scoring layer itself is MODELLED. Two of its kernels carry their own VALIDATED rows in the verification matrix, the inverse-Simpson diversity kernel (resilience::diversity) and the rank-order statistics kernel (resilience::stats); that validates the arithmetic, not the scores built on it.

The scoring engine (src/resilience/) consumes these capabilities and emits per-dimension sub-scores, never a single phantom number. See src/verification.rs for the machine-checked status invariants.

DHS RPCF v2.0: what the framework defines, and Kshana's own sub-score categories#

The published framework (Resilient PNT Conformance Framework, Version 2.0, 26 April 2022, DHS Science and Technology Directorate with CISA) defines three core functions (section 5.2: Prevent, Respond, Recover), resilience levels 0 to 4 (section 5.3) and eight numbered minimum requirements spread over Levels 1 to 4 (section 5.3, restated in 5.5), plus an evaluation approach (section 8). It does not define a list of seven technique categories. An earlier version of this page, and the resilience module comments, described seven "RPCF technique categories"; the words Obfuscate and Diversify do not appear in v2.0. The text of that document was re-read on 2026-10-09 and no such list was found.

The seven sub-score names the scoring engine emits (Obfuscate, Limit, Verify, Isolate, Diversify, Mitigate, Recover; "OLVIDMR" is our mnemonic) are therefore Kshana's own scoring categories, kept for output stability. They are not DHS terms and the rows below do not say DHS requires them. Where a category lines up with a framework requirement the last column says so; where it does not, it says "none".

Kshana sub-score category Kshana capability used as the driver Module Status Nearest RPCF v2.0 reference
Obfuscate Declared technique × source quality (no direct behavioural driver) resilience::score MODELLED none (a prevention technique; section 5.2, Prevent)
Limit Declared technique × source quality resilience::score MODELLED none (a prevention technique; section 5.2, Prevent)
Verify Impairment-detector AUC (area under the curve) under the scenario (spoof/jam/meacon monitors) impairment_eval, resilience::score MODELLED Level 2 requirement 4; Level 3 requirement 7
Isolate Declared technique × source quality resilience::score MODELLED Level 3 requirement 6
Diversify Independent-group count → inverse-Simpson effective diversity resilience::diversity MODELLED Level 4 requirement 8; section 5.5 (common mode)
Mitigate Availability under denial fom, resilience::score MODELLED section 5.2, Respond
Recover Holdover coast × bounded-degradation gate fom, holdover, resilience::timeline MODELLED Level 2 requirement 5; section 5.2, Recover

The per-requirement mapping to the real framework, with what Kshana outputs support evidence for and what is left over, is in compliance/dhs-rpcf.md.

RethinkPNT / Firesmith RDRR functions#

Function Driver Module Status
Resist Mean of Obfuscate/Limit/Isolate/Diversify sub-scores resilience::score MODELLED
Detect Verify sub-score (detector AUC) resilience::score MODELLED
Respond Mitigate sub-score (availability) resilience::score MODELLED
Recover Holdover × bounded gate; resilience-timeline key performance indicators (KPIs: detect/react/recover/loss) resilience::timeline MODELLED

Yang Yuanxi criteria (the subset the timing/detection figures of merit speak to)#

Criterion Driver Module Status
Availability Availability under denial resilience::score MODELLED
Reliability Filter integrity fraction fom, resilience::score MODELLED
Continuity Holdover × bounded gate resilience::timeline MODELLED
Accuracy Timing/quality proxy — position-domain accuracy is not part of the score. fom::positioning_performance turns a supplied position covariance and HPL (horizontal protection level) into CEP/SEP/2DRMS (circular error probable, spherical error probable, twice the distance root mean square), but no scenario feeds it into the resilience score resilience::score MODELLED (timing-domain only)

What this cross-walk does not claim#

  • No conferred RPCF Level. The assigned Level is a tentative, simulation-derived reading with an explicit bounded-degradation gate, not a conferred maturity.
  • No position-domain accuracy in the score. The resilience sub-scores are built from timing-domain and detection metrics. The engine does compute positions elsewhere (the pvt, gnss-ins and leo-pvt kinds) and protection levels (the integrity kind), but the scoring layer does not consume them.
  • No field validation. The reference panel and threat ensemble are synthetic, parameter-grounded reductions (resilience::panel), stated as a first-class limitation.

The companion study (resilience::study) exists precisely to show that collapsing these dimensions into one composite score or one Level produces a rating whose architecture ranking is unstable under defensible weighting and threat choices — so this cross-walk is a measurement layer to be read per-dimension, not a single grade to rate a product against.

Resilience and vertical scenarios that exercise these layers#

The bundled scenarios below run the threat and recovery machinery the cross-walk rows point at. Each is a real run of the named kind; every one is MODELLED (no field data).

Scenario (scenarios/) Kind What it shows
conflict-resilience.toml conflict-resilience Layered PNT under a shared jamming/spoofing threat: a seeded Monte Carlo of layer denial, inverse-variance fusion of the survivors, the single-layer vs layered total-loss ratio, and how correlated denial collapses that ratio. Its Monte-Carlo-to-closed-form and fusion identities are checked by in-crate tests; the kind has no verification-matrix row, so it is graded MODELLED here.
leo-resilience-gnss-jammed-leo-carries.toml campaign GNSS (global navigation satellite system) jammed, a low Earth orbit (LEO) PNT layer carries the user, integrity kept (three phases on one timeline).
leo-resilience-multiband-diversity.toml, leo-resilience-spoof-monitors.toml campaign One jammer against a four-band receiver; which spoofing monitor sees which spoofer.
leo-resilience-js-margin.toml spectrum The jammer-to-signal (J/S) margin from received power.
leo-resilience-spoof-doppler.toml leo-pass Spoofing detection by Doppler and pass-geometry consistency.
leo-vertical-5g-network-timing.toml, leo-vertical-critical-infrastructure-timing.toml campaign Base-station and critical-infrastructure timing in holdover, with LEO time.
leo-vertical-autonomous-vehicle.toml, leo-vertical-rail-maritime.toml, leo-vertical-polar-arctic.toml, leo-vertical-asset-tracking-iot.toml campaign Road, rail, maritime, polar and Internet of Things (IoT) users with a LEO layer.
automotive-urban-canyon.toml, small-uas-jammed-nav.toml gnss-ins GNSS/INS (inertial navigation system) dead reckoning through an urban canyon and through jamming on a small uncrewed aircraft.
maritime-port-approach-coast.toml, rail-tunnel-coast.toml ins-trn-coast How long an INS keeps a ship or a train inside its limit with GNSS denied.
maritime-strait-jamming.toml, maritime-spoof-position-push.toml jamming, spoof-detect A maritime jammer; detecting a spoofer that drags a ship's reported position.